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1. Introduction 
Scenarios enable organisation and translation of economic, technological, competitive, political, and 
societal information into a framework [1] to uncover possible alternative futures, challenge 
dominant worldviews [2] and inform decision-making. They are widely used for business planning, 
devising military strategy, or to inform policy development [3]. Developments of the techniques in 
recent years have made the scenario planning process faster and more efficient [4]. However, 
Chermack and Coons [4] recognise that this has led to disappointing results, whilst others warn of 
the need to check for underlying biases [5] or a lack of variation [6]. One particular scenario building 
method is field anomaly relaxation (FAR) which aims to create a set of internally consistent futures 
for policy formulation and decision-making purposes [7–10]. By building on Lewin’s social field 
theory, Zwicky’s morphological approach and the relaxation methods of engineering, FAR is a 
‘whole-pattern futures projection’ method [9]. FAR provides a structured and transparent approach 
for systematic thinking through a highly ordered series of events. It is a variant of morphological 
analysis [11,12] and underwent refinement [13–16], followed by extensions for different types of 
problems: replacing the tree-structure of scenario development with a network allowing for a game-
theoretic approach [17,18], hybridisation with soft-systems methodology [19], and the use of 
mathematical methods to discover maximally diverse scenarios [20]. FAR has been used in a wide 
variety of application domains, for example business-related planning [21–23], food security [20], 
military planning [24,25], policy development [26], and the future development of text mining [27]. 
With many technological and non-technological options that may change the way society generates, 
delivers and consumes energy, smart grids (SG) are seen as the silver bullet of cost-effective, reliable 
and low carbon energy systems. The development of SGs is a socio-technical process [28], 
constructed incrementally as the outcome of multifaceted interactions across technologies, social, 
financial and governmental interventions [29]. While some aspects of SGs have been included in 
wider electricity network scenarios to date [30–32], they are limited in addressing the complexity of 
SG development. This is because the development of SGs goes beyond the electricity industry, 
interacting fundamentally with Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and transport 
sectors [33], and dependent on other socio-technical factors. Social factors include consumer 
concerns about data privacy/security and loss of control due to remote operation of appliances to 
manage peak load [34]. Market related factors include the development of pricing mechanisms and 
transition access management through regulation [35] and the provision of market and regulatory 
systems that will drive innovation and make innovation and investment in new services and 
technologies viable [36]. Financial and business related factors include the tensions between firms’ 
seeking to gain competitive advantage [37–39] and the public good nature of some smart grid 
technologies [40] in a deregulated electricity industry; as well as the need to leverage enhanced 
rates of financing to support this new infrastructure while achieving a fair distribution of costs 
[41,42]. These factors are interdependent such that any choices made in any of these areas will 
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influence the choices available in other domains. Consequently, any SG scenarios recognising their 
socio-technical nature need to consider these multi-dimensional factors, their interactions, and key 
transition points – rather than mere end points. This paper addresses this gap by employing and 
augmenting the FAR method. In principle this method can accommodate any number of factors, 
though the practical upper limited is suggested as seven [9]. Each factor can have alternative states 
(e.g., high vs. low) to be interrogated to form possible future states. Then these states are checked 
for their consistency [43] and surviving ones are formed into a string of events in a tree-like diagram 
starting from the present point to the future.  
Yet, to date there is no detailed account of how FAR can be used to analyse SG futures, even though 
their application to engineering design, scenario development, policy analysis and innovation, with 
limited detail account of the method, was noted [44]. Using the UK as a case study, this paper 
addresses this gap by providing a detailed account of the development and application of an 
augmented FAR to produce scenarios for the development of smart grids in the UK. The objectives of 
this paper are three-fold: i) to provide a methodological account of our augmenting of FAR to 
incorporate expert feedback in developing UK smart grid scenarios; ii) to demonstrate how this 
method can be used to develop ‘scenario pathways’ dynamically rather than mere end points and iii) 
to identify areas that may be overlooked in the implementation of FAR, despite its intentions to 
become ‘totality research’ [45, p.30] and pursuit of an ambitious research programme involving a 
multidisciplinary research team. 
The next section provides a background to the research in terms of the definition of smart grids, a 
review of SG-related scenarios, and their strengths and weaknesses in addressing SG development. 
Section 3 presents FAR methodology in-depth as presented in the literature. Section 4 discusses our 
extension to FAR and 5 offers a discussion of our findings. Section 6 is devoted to conclusions. 
2. Smart grids as a wicked problem 
The considerable variation in the definition of SGs across working groups and countries [46] is due to 
different functions and services that a smart grid may support – the term is somewhat misleading 
since it suggests an endpoint rather than a comparative state which is merely smarter than the 
current system. A broad and commonly-used definition comes from the Smart Grids European 
Technology Platform, suggesting that SGs are ’electricity networks that can intelligently integrate the 
behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – 
in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economical and secure electricity supplies’ [47]. 
Rather than a technology per se, SGs are an application (or group of applications) that better 
integrates different parts of the system: the supply mix; the technology and infrastructure 
characteristics of the system; data (availability, access and type); the regulatory and market 
frameworks; policy incentives and their effectiveness; consumer capability and willingness to 
engage. Various functions might be enabled or disabled in different markets as a result of 
interactions between these factors. For example, degrees of smart meter functionality will play a 
role, as will data access. To expand on this, if identical smart meters are installed in two different 
markets and in one of these markets, DNO access to real time smart meter data is limited to 
aggregated data for a street or with a time delay, then they will have limited insights compared to a 
DNO with better access, be it less aggregated data or less time-delayed access to data. The former is 
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likely to have less knowledge about what low carbon technologies are installed and less ability to 
influence and manage demands from the grid. Their options for responsiveness, and for network 
management are thus more limited. Essentially, either of these differences (or many others) might 
emerge for technical or regulatory or social reasons, but the result would be less options for 
smartness on one system compared to the other. We argue that SGs are better identified in terms of 
functions and services that they can enable [48], and identify five essential functions in the UK 
context: 
 Balancing a power grid with high volumes of variable renewable electricity generation. 
 Increasing observability and controllability of the power grid. Observability is achieved by 
increasing sensor deployment (including smart meters) allowing DNOs and/or others have 
greater insight into the operational demands of the networks. Controllability (limited by 
observability) is achieved by deploying ICT and data management / mining technologies.  
 Enabling deployment of demand-side reduction (DSR) technologies, that is reductions in 
demand or in peak demand on the customer side of the meter. It is expected that increased 
volumes of intermittent renewables will require DSR for balancing. 
 Enabling active network management (ANM) as an alternative to the historical paradigm of 
passive network operation. ANM techniques allow for differentiated levels of smartness 
where appropriate across a network. 
 Allowing the integration of active loads by deploying ANM to balance networks. Different 
ANM strategies exploit various aspects of observability and controlability. 
These informed how we considered outcomes to be more or less smart. This focus does not rule out 
the possibility of other functions emerging which might be more useful or even as essential in other 
territories, since the starting point for selection might be different. These functions might yield 
benefits such as more effective integration of distributed production and higher and more volatile 
consumption, with new ICT approaches acting as a key enabler of many of these options. The role of 
DSR, via automated processes or active participation [49], is seen by many experts as key to enabling 
considerable volumes of system flexibility. Yet, there is substantial concern that this might not 
emerge due to a number of technical, economic and social capacities that end users need to possess 
[50] and associated social acceptability costs [51]. 
The mutual interdependencies across regulatory, organisational, policy, social, behavioural, and 
technical aspects make SGs an exemplary ‘wicked problem’. According to Ritchey [52], wicked 
problems are ‘those complex, ever changing societal and organisational planning problems that are 
difficult to define and structure properly because they won’t keep still. They’re messy, ambiguous and 
reactive, i.e., they fight back when you try to do something with them’. Critically, wicked problems 
cannot be solved by only one perspective or discipline; but rather require an interdisciplinary 
approach that captures systemic interactions and interdependencies.  
2.1 Review of smart grid scenarios 
Only some elements of SGs have been covered in electricity/energy scenarios to date. In particular, 
there is a significant difference in the level of ICT integration envisioned within different scenarios, 
as well as how the future energy industry may be changed by the entrance of new stakeholders such 
as telecommunications companies and other actors currently seen as third parties. Focusing 
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specifically on the UK, a selected list of energy scenarios and their coverage of specific SG aspects is 
summarised in Table 1. Ofgem’s LENS Project [53] is a scenario study examining the UK electricity 
transmission and distribution networks, but does not discuss at length the future role that ICT may 
play within the system nor its implications for the energy market. Rather, it focuses on who would 
be the 'controlling' body of the electricity system, drawn from current stakeholders (distribution 
network operators, transmission operators, consumers etc.). DECC [54] and National Grid [55] also 
focus on generation and consumption technologies rather than ICT integration and the roles of other 
actors along the supply chain, including consumers. Elders et al. [31] briefly mention SG technology 
and ICT incorporation, but mostly examine the addition of renewable energy generation, discussing 
how the industry model may continue to be dominated by large, centralised actors, or might shift to 
microgrids and small-scale community generation. The Transition Pathway Project [56,57] only 
briefly mentions SGs as a tool for improving the efficiency of the system. To date, the role of ICT 
within different energy / electricity scenarios has been largely ignored. 
Similarly, whilst a number of studies focus on the impact of technological advancement and 
economic growth on the future of SGs and the energy industry, most do not take into account the 
extent of the likely impact of policy changes and consumer behaviour. Where these issues are raised, 
they are often not discussed in detail. DECC’s Pathway Analysis 2050 [58] does not attempt to 
include detailed policy or behavioural aspects. Ofgem’s LENS Project [53] and the San Diego Smart 
Grid Study Final Report [59] include little detail about the level of public support for environmental 
or energy policies. These studies also provide minimal proposals for future government policies and 
regulations, usually only stating whether or not governments will be ‘supportive’ of a transition. 
Elders et al. [31] and Edison Electric Institute (EEI)’s workshop on USA SG scenarios [60] assume that 
consumer behaviour will act broadly in accordance with economic growth – i.e. when there is high 
economic growth then there will be a high public desire for sustainability policy and SG technology. 
Although there is some evidence that those on high incomes may be more interested in smart 
technologies [61], which are likely to command a price premium, a clear relationship between 
economic growth and SG adoption is by no way a given: societal norms, new functionalities or 
concerns (e.g., around data security) may outweigh economic drivers of technology diffusion. The 
EEI study [60] does, however, include a relatively detailed outline of government policies and 
regulations that may be instituted to accelerate the transition to a smarter grid. The Transition 
Pathways Project [56,57] recognises co-evolution of technology, institutions, business strategy, and 
user practices and considers small-scale individual actions as well as large-scale systemic shifts in the 
energy industry. Yet, likely impact of policy changes and consumer behavior, availability of capital, 
data privacy and security and how they might influence the emergence of different scenarios are 
overlooked. 
The issue most overlooked by future energy scenarios is that of data privacy and security, and how 
consumers may react to the collection and use of their data by both public bodies and ICT 
companies. Types of data accessed, its latency and frequency are vital for the successful adoption 
and integration of SG technologies [48,62]. Objections to more sharing of personal information may 
lead to opposition to technology uptake, as has been demonstrated to be an issue in the Dutch case 
[63], and expressed amongst certain groups in the UK [64], and influence the nature and scope of 
smartness in a future power grid. 
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Table 1. Smart grid relevant aspects of energy scenariosa 


















































































































































































Focus on new energy generation technology 
and D/T network development, outline public 
and political behaviour as key parameters but 
don't expand on them in scenarios, just say 
whether political environment is 'liberal 
market-based' or ‘interventionist’, and 
whether public attitudes are weak/strong. No 
analysis of future co-evolution of parameters. 




Focus on who would be the 'controlling' body 
of the system (D/T, consumer, etc.); no 
mention of smart meters; mentions changing 
business/industry model but only talks about 
current stakeholders, little mention of new 
entrants from other sectors. Attitudes and 
government role are drivers of scenarios, but 
no detail on policies, regulations, etc., not 
much about consumer attitudes and ICT 
implications for market. 




Focus on energy generation, not ICT 
integration into the system. Does not 
attempt to include policy or international 
context. Only about physical limits based on 
technology. 
  x x x x x   x   x               x       x  
NG [55] Focus on energy demand and generation, 
specifically gas generation. Nothing about ICT 
and evolution of energy system. 
x  x x x x   x x                           x   
DECC 
[54] 
Assessment of different demand and 
generation technologies to achieve least cost 
emissions reductions. Implicit assumptions of 
behaviour change with no consideration of 
ICT and new actors. 




More explicit focus on governance patterns. 
Pathways based on co-evolution of tech, 
institutions, business strategy, and user 
practices. Trend based scenarios, but do 
account for 2050 UK 80% reduction goal as a 
catalyst for more emphasis on enviro policies. 




Pathways focus on actors and governance in 
energy industry. Major players are 
government, business and consumers/ 
communities. 






Regional cost-benefit analysis of smart grids. 
Focus on SG impact on efficiency and 
dependability, and the tech that could be 
used to implement it, but don't talk about 
renewables integration, etc. focus on current 
grid, don't consider changing business model 
or new stakeholders. include time line and 
recommendations for implementation of SG 
system in SD. 




Doesn't consider international pressure on 
social/ political context. Does emphasize that 
the market will expand with new 
stakeholders in ICT industry (Google, Wal-
mart etc.) 






iction x x   x x ? x x x x 
IEA [65] Report on energy technologies with one 
chapter on SGs. Focus on technology and 
how SG implementation will reduce 
emissions. Provides prescriptions on what 
needs to be done but not who should do 
it/how. No emphasis on consumer reactions/ 
behaviour. No consideration of interaction of 
various factors. x x x x x x x x x x x x/2 x/2   x x         x x x x 
IEA [66] Based on BLUE map and Baseline scenarios, it 
talks about policy and industry changes that 
need to be made. More prescriptive analysis 
of current situation, less emphasis on 
scenario. Demand shifts are mentioned 
across OECD and China on very basic level. 
x x x x x x x x x   x x x   x x x/2 x x x x x x x 
a x/2 denotes ‘some’ coverage of the relevant aspect 
* SM: Smart meters and data collection,  ** Distribution/ Transmission Networks,   *** Distributed Generation 
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2.2 The challenge for future socio-technical smart grid scenarios 
Developing a comprehensive and usable set of SG scenarios requires attention to interdependencies 
between policy, organisational, market, business and regulatory systems, and the diverging 
perspectives of many different actors including consumers. The geographically divergent nature of 
low carbon energy systems [67,68] requires attention to spatial, along with temporal, aspects of 
electricity grids such that geographical heterogeneity and spatial clustering in SG development, 
associated urban-rural disparity [69] and dependencies on electric vehicle, smart home and other 
relevant local infrastructure [61] are taken into account. Furthermore, they should ideally capture 
uncertainties (e.g., wildcards) that may fundamentally (re-)shape the development of SGs.  
Critically, and in contrast to previous scenarios in this field, new scenarios should capture broader 
systemic and cross-sectoral interactions representing not only the electricity industry and technical 
factors, but also the ICT, buildings and transport sectors and social, economic and political factors. 
The principal cross-sectoral interactions are: data access, consumer concerns about data 
privacy/security and loss of control of household devices due to remote operation to manage peak 
load [61,70,71]; development of dynamic pricing mechanisms and transition access management 
through regulation; provision of market and network regulatory systems to drive innovation and 
make innovation and investment in new services and technologies viable, and allow firms to seek 
competitive advantage (e.g., [37,38]; addressing the so-called broken value chain) in a deregulated 
electricity industry; as well as financing of infrastructure and achieving fair distribution of costs. This 
necessitates an in-depth, truly multidisciplinary approach that is consistent with the socio-technical 
transitions literature which describes how a particular cluster of technologies/services might evolve, 
diffuse and transform linked societal systems (energy-buildings-transport-ICT) and practices [e.g., 
72,73]. These issues cannot be addressed through linear thinking [74]. These factors possess 
different types of uncertainties, dynamics and relative importance; capturing these in a simple twin-
axis framework will not allow exploration of all plausible futures.  
3. Method 
A FAR approach is able to incorporate the multiple dimensions of a ‘wicked problem’ and interrogate 
their interactions. In this section we first describe the core FAR method, and then our developments 
to generate the augmented scheme. 
3.1 The core FAR methodology 
FAR involves a 4-step cycle that iterates between holistic (‘wholes’) composition and its constituents 
(‘parts’) and their interactions (Figure 1). This enables it ‘to bring scattered information and insight 
together, allowing composition of a smaller set of alternatives from which internal inconsistencies 
have been removed’ [13, p.28]. FAR can be implemented in a cyclic mode by feeding scenarios 
developed in step 4 into step 1 in a second cycle. Yet, added effort may not be worthwhile if the first 




Figure 1. The original FAR method in four stages [9] 
The four distinct steps of FAR are: 
1. Imagine alternative futures. To incorporate a wide range of possible futures that can be 
shaped and refined as the process continues. The aim is to generate ‘discussion and serious 
thought within the project team so that its members share a common set of images of future 
field prospects’ [9, p.337]. 
2. Construct a symbolic language to describe the future. To distinguish and bring together the 
many threads running through the visions of the future developed during step one, it is 
necessary to develop a ‘a memorable acronym’ [43] that can be used to refer easily to 
individual configurations. This ought to be easy to grasp yet remain broad enough to 
describe the most significant characteristics of the visions of the future. These 
characteristics, so-called ‘sectors’, should not exceed seven due to the capacity of human 
memory. These should be mutually exclusive to avoid any overlap – it is partly the final 
scenarios’ distinctness from one another that makes them interesting. Actual values each 
sector takes are called ‘factors’. The sector/factor array (‘morphological box’) defines the 
problem space [75]. The arrangement of sectors and factors into an array (e.g. Table 3) 
allows for ready comparison between them and demonstrates how many configurations are 
possible. 
3. Relax the anomalies. The objective is to reduce the number of possible configurations to a 
smaller number of internally consistent futures. Any given configuration is composed of 
factors numbering however many sectors have been used, and it is the relationships 
between each pair of factors that is the focus of the first part of step 3. Whilst Rhyne [7,9] 
proposed eliminating inconsistent pairs based on a broad question about plausibility, Coyle 
and Yong [15] put forward an approach more nuanced than a simple yes/no answer. This 
involves developing a matrix in which it is possible to grade the consistency of each factor 
against every other factor from another sector. Using a numerical scale, it is possible to gain 
insight into which configurations are more consistent than others. Rhyne’s phrase ‘relax the 
anomalies’, simply refers to the removal of any pairs that are deemed insufficiently 
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consistent or ‘testing for consistency1’ [43]. The discourse to assess pairwise combinations 
leads to a ‘transdisciplinary plane’ [9]. The second part of step 3 is to seek a ‘gestalt 
appreciation’ [43] of whether the configuration, taken as a whole, has a consistency to it. 
This is because individual ‘pairwise’ consistency ratings do not ensure consistency between 
the pairs that together make up the configuration. Ritchey [76] identifies three types of 
inconsistencies to take into account: logical contradictions (driven from the nature of the 
concepts involved), empirical constraints (relationships not being plausible on empirical 
grounds), and normative constraints (due to ethical or political considerations). Of these, he 
suggests that normative consistency checking is saved to last so that all possible futures are 
explored, rather than only the desirable ones. Together the two parts of step 3 reduce the 
number of configurations by several orders of magnitude. 
4. Compose alternative scenarios. The surviving configurations are then assembled to make 
scenarios – strings of configurations that together describe how the future unfolds. Coyle et 
al. (1994) build on Rhyne’s method by merging similar configurations together into one 
cluster. We recount our own experiences of this below; however, the essential feature of 
step 4 is the creation of scenarios using the configurations that result from the previous 
step. This is done through a highly iterative process, taking place over several days to a 
week, where the central question is ‘can we imagine a situation where this leads to that?’ 
This is, as Coyle and Yong [15, p.275] say, ‘by far the most subjective part of FAR’, but the 
experiences of both Rhyne and Coyle (and, in the end, ourselves) were that familiarity with 
the symbolic language and clustered configurations results in a certain confidence in their 
ultimate ordering. 
 
3.2 An augmented FAR methodology 
A system as technically complex as SG requires development the FAR to be extended. Whilst we 
have done this in the context of SG, we suggest that other similarly complex problems share this 
need. The SG proposition is characterised by bottom-up technical development and deployment in a 
framework of strict regulation (technical and market), user engagement and government policy. 
User engagement to initiate demand-side response is essential for a cost-effective development of 
SGs [62]. The electrical power system (generation, transmission, distribution) is not free to develop 
in an unconstrained fashion. Any work to develop possible futures of SGs needs to incorporate the 
specialized technological power sector knowledge alongside regulation, policy, social aspects and 
business models. We therefore opted to formally incorporate expert elicitation in an augmented FAR 
(Figure 2). 
 
1 In earlier work, Coyle and Yong (1996) refer to ‘coherence’ rating. 
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Figure 2. The augmented FAR method incorporating expert elicitation. 
We describe five novel developments to the core FAR methodology (the details of implementation 
are explained in Section 4): 
1. Stakeholder engagement: Rhyne [7] notes the benefits of intermittent involvement of 
decision-makers and analysts who may use the results (scenarios) in the process, but a full 
set of stakeholders is domain experts, decision-makers, analysts, and end-users. Expert 
stakeholder groups can provide domain knowledge, be a critical voice, checks results, and 
ensure transparency at each stage. Keeping stakeholders engaged at each stage ensures that 
scenarios are relevant for end-users.  
2. Multidisciplinary expertise: As some technical systems (such as SG) developed from an 
already sophisticated socio-technical system, further sources of expert knowledge should be 
integrated into the first stage of the process where alternative futures and their constituents 
are defined. While Rhyne [7] advocated the use of Delphi to extract information early on and 
Coyle et al. [13] noted the benefits of obtaining inputs from experts, our project is the first 
to implement this expert elicitation method. Following Coyle and Yong [15], we suggest 
creating a mind map to structure this expert input to yield the defining elements of the 
sector-factor array. 
3. Factor exclusivity: We underline the particular importance and extra attention which needs 
to be paid to exclusivity in the sector-factor array. This is because of the multiple 
interdependencies across different sectors shaping complex technical systems, which 
necessitate simplifications when defining the factors. Delineation between sectors captures 
the principal underlying socio-technical aspects without crossing over the sectors. 
4. Dynamics: There are two dimensions in defining the dynamics of many real-world systems 
that FAR needs to incorporate: logical ordering and timescales. Neither identifying event 
timescales nor assigning likelihoods to their occurrence are formally part of the FAR method, 
since it is not explicitly a forecasting tool. The logical ordering of processes or activities is a 
strong constraint. The engineering practicalities of many technical systems necessitate 
considering the logical sequence of events giving the potential for critical junctures (or 
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‘branching points’) to determine future states of the system. The temporal spread of these 
ordered events is a less strong (but ever-present) constraint since technology development 
may occur at different rates, but reach the same end-point. Their co-evolution determines 
the spread and rate of development. Project team knowledge and expert feedback (stage 4) 
identify the correct logical ordering, and an expert workshop identifies the temporal spread.  
5. Uncertainty: To accounts for degrees of uncertainty we suggest using a symmetric negative 
and positive range to indicate inconsistency/consistency. Previous studies have used only a 
single negative value for conducting the pairwise comparison of factor consistencies [15]. 
We summarise the differences between the original and our augmented FAR method in Table 2. 
Table 2. Comparison of core and augmented FAR method 
  Step 1. Visualise 
the future 
Step 2. A symbolic 
language of the future 












Purpose Identify a set of 
images of future 
prospects 
Distil sector/ factor 
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images of future 
prospects 
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4. Implementing the augmented FAR 
This extended method was developed in a 24 month project, and implemented through face-to-face 
team meetings, interviews, a two-stage Delphi, and four workshops specifically focusing on 
developing the scenarios. A project advisory group (PAG, N=9) was drawn from experts across the 
industry (N=5), policy (N=2), NGO (N=1) and academia (N=1). The PAG met at six-monthly intervals 
over half-a-day meetings on voluntary basis. Following project team discussions (used in the 
standard method) and review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, we followed a participatory 
process by conducting interviews with individual experts (N =18) representing power generation, 
transmission, and distribution, consumer rights, policy and market regulation, and ICT infrastructure 
to identify drivers and barriers to the development of SGs [62]. The interviews took place during a 
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three-month period, typically taking 60-90 minutes (all under 120 minutes). Building on the 
interview data, a further two rounds of data collection from a wider range of experts were 
conducted using anonymised online surveys. The two-stage survey (N =77, N=44) applied the Policy 
Delphi method [77]; stage two participants had to have completed the stage 1 survey. These surveys 
occurred over a six month period. This identified the drivers and barriers associated with SG growth 
and the essential functions likely to be required to provide for development of SGs in the UK 
context. This process also allowed us to identify interdependencies in the process of SG 
development [48]. The dynamics of scenarios were discussed and developed in an expert workshop 
(N=23) including representatives of DNOs, Ofgem, the transmission system operator, policymakers, 
ICT companies and energy consultants. The employment sectors of the participants in each activity 
are given in Table A.1. 
Previously documented FAR projects have the ‘study team members’ [9] or ‘the analysts’ [7] 
undertake steps 1 and 2. This exercise expanded the project team’s expertise through inputs from 
the experts via PAG meetings, interviews and the online Delphi survey. Potential overlaps of the 
experts who have contributed to interviews and the online survey means the project gathered 
insights from 77 to 133 experts. These extensive data collection exercises provided strong 
foundations for our implementation of the augmented FAR. The insights emerging from these 
participatory methods were analysed and refined by the multidisciplinary team with expertise 
spanning across energy systems modeling, power system engineering, energy policy and 
environmental psychology. In four workshops, the project team identified the following seven 
sectors: Market (M), Users (U), Data and information (D), Supply (S), Policy (P), Investment 
conditions (I), and Networks (N). These sectors are abbreviated as MUDSPIN to ensure that no sector 
takes priority or importance over the others [7,13]. The main characteristics of these sectors are as 
follows: 
1. Market describes the structure of the energy industry, specifically the growth of new energy-
related services (for example, new aggregators, new and extended approaches to energy 
services, community trading and others) and whether the providers are the incumbents or new 
market entrants. 
2. Users include electricity consumers (residential, commercial, and industrial), the extent to which 
they are willing and/or able to respond to signals to adjust their energy usage (active) or not 
(passive), and the total national level of demand. 
3. Data and information captures the source, scale and granularity of data available to the 
transmission and distribution network operators.  
4. Supply represents power generation characteristics, which can be achieved by various 
technologies. 
5. Policy focuses on the availability of incentives to drive SG development and whether or not there 
is effective co-ordination.  
6. Investment conditions reflect the relative expense of capital and whether the regulatory 
framework is conducive to investment for innovation. 
7. Networks take into account the extent of active management within networks and reflects the 
smartness of the wider system to accommodate more complex loads, for example, greater levels 
of renewables, distributed generation, heat pumps, and electric vehicles. 
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Each sector has mutually exclusive ‘factors’ representing different potential future states of the 
sector (Table 3). The mind map was useful for distilling out the factors and developing a common 
language across the team. Keeping the factors descriptive avoids the need to specify detailed rates 
of technological development, however, some aspects merited specific inclusion. For example we 
treated users as a corollary of consumer engagement as this was the only sector that could include 
the social aspects of SG directly. This sector combines an effect (level of demand) and the social 
circumstances that may influence the flexibility of that demand (whether the users are active or 
passive). To the best of our knowledge no previously documented FAR projects have brought 
different elements together in the same factors in this manner. Using this approach enabled us to 
finesse the differences of definition which inevitably arise, but perhaps have similar practical 
consequences for the physical system (delivery of power). The term ‘active’ and ‘passive’ has 
different meanings within the electricity sector. For power engineers, an active consumer could be 
one who adopts (or allows the installation of) a device for demand-side management which then 
remains ‘invisible’ to the consumer – a so-called ‘fit and forget’ solution. For others, an active 
consumer could be one who makes frequent decisions about their power use. 
The 2008 Climate Change Act [78] set an ambition of achieving significant emissions reduction target 
by 2050, which has focused the time horizon of many UK energy scenarios to 2050 [31,53,54,56–58]. 
Our study also adopts time horizon of 2050. One effect of this was to rule out substantive 
deployment of nuclear fusion. 
Table 3. The seven sectors and their factors (the ‘sector-factor array’) 
Market Users Data & 
information 
Supply Policy Investment Networks 
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4.1 Conducting the pairwise consistency checks 
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Using more than a single negative value for inconsistency accommodates degrees of uncertainty in 
greater depth in environmental and social systems (Table 4). The scale captures the plausibility of a 
world in which the two variables occur together, and therefore degrees of ‘implausibility’ are 
important because they will result in a more detailed range of scenarios. Using zero to represent 
neither consistency nor inconsistency, the temptation to apply a middle value is removed. 
Table 4. The interpretation for the pairwise comparison matrix 
Value Inconsistency  Consistency 
-3 Inconsistent in all circumstances  No consistency 
-2 Inconsistent in most circumstances } Unlikely to be consistent -1 Inconsistent in some circumstances 
1 
Unlikely to be inconsistent { Consistent in some circumstances 2 Consistent in most circumstances 
3 No inconsistency  Consistent in all circumstances 
0 Neither consistent nor inconsistent 
 
The pairwise consistency scoring of factors was conducted by the project team, split into pairs for 
each of the sectors with cross-checking carried out by a different pair of team members. The 
decisions for assigning a value to each pairwise comparison were based on all of the evidence 
assembled in stage 1 of the augmented FAR method. Notes to justify each decision were kept and 
validated in the cross-checking stage. Differences between the primary and cross-checking steps 
were resolved (and recorded) by the two pairs of team members. Any remaining differences were 
resolved by the team collectively. The final array is shown in Figure 3. Only two of the 253 pairwise 
comparisons were considered to be neither consistent nor inconsistent, suggesting that the sectors 
and factors used are appropriate and unambiguous. 
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Low growth in new energy 
related services, existing actors 3 1 1 -2 3 2 2 1 1 2 -1 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 
Low growth in new energy 
related services, new (additional) 
actors 1 1 2 -1 -2 -1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 
High growth in new energy 
related services, existing actors -1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 -2 -2 -2 2 3 
High growth in new energy 
related services, new (additional) 





Low increase in demand, passive 
consumers         3 2 2 2 3 3 -3 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 
High increase in demand, passive 
consumers         2 2 2 2 3 3 -3 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 
Low increase in demand, active 
consumers         -2 -1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 -1 -1 -3 2 3 
High increase in demand, active 












Customer billing info only (the 
BAU case),  plus basic network 
data                 3 3 -3 3 2 -2 -3 -1 -1 2 3 3 -3 -3 
Aggregated historical data only 
                2 1 -1 3 2 -1 -1 3 2 -2 -3 3 -2 -2 
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Aggregated near to real-time 
data available 
                1 1 2 -3 -1 2 3 3 2 -2 -3 -3 3 3 
Disaggregated near to real-time 
data available 





Characterized by inflexible 
generation                       3 -2 -1 -2 2 -1 2 -1 3 1 -2 
Characterized by flexible 
generation                       3 -1 -1 -1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 
Characterized by variable 




Weak  incentives, no 
coordination of smarter energy 
delivery                               1 -1 3 2 3 -1 -3 
Strong  incentives, no 
coordination of smarter energy 
delivery                               2 -1 2 1 1 1 1 
Weak  incentives, coordination 
of smarter energy delivery                               2 1 -1 -2 -1 1 2 
Strong  incentives, coordination 












Low-cost capital, constructive 
regulatory investment 
framework                                       1 3 3 
Expensive capital, constructive 
regulatory investment 
framework                                       2 2 2 
Low-cost capital, obstructive 
regulatory investment 
framework                                       2 -2 -2 
Expensive capital, obstructive 
regulatory investment 
framework                                       2 -3 -3 
 
Figure 3. The finalised consistency matrix  
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We used the Parmenides EIDOS software (version 8.2) to calculate the overall consistency rating of 
each configuration and rank them accordingly (Section 0). Using the second round of combination 
elimination removes those configurations which have a highly inconsistent sector/factor (but which 
are otherwise plausible). This holistic assessment is an important step in ensuring the physical and 
social consistency. The remaining configurations are clustered together, then combinations 
containing some intuitive inconsistency were removed. This step blends with the scenario 
construction stage and exploits a strength of FAR as a reflexive process. Furthermore, this blended 
step avoids the need to evaluate consistency of pairwise combination with a third sector/factor, 
reducing computational complexity. 
 
4.2 Composing the scenarios 
By using dichotomous (i.e. yes/no) pairwise consistency rating, previous practitioners note 
significant reductions in the number of plausible configurations to consider in stage 3, ranging from 
99% (from 189,000 to fewer than 100) [7] to 97% reduction (from 14,400 to 403) [79]. The use of a 
graded consistency rating necessitates an alternative approach as the number of plausible 
configurations can be reasonably large. When using a degree of consistency rating varying from 0 to 
3, Coyle and Yong [15] worked with under 100 (91 out of 4608) configurations that include pairwise 
consistency ratings of 2 and 3. In our work, we followed this latter approach to work with 
configurations that include pairwise ratings of 2 and 3. 
EIDOS calculates the consistency rating of all configurations, which are listed in descending order. 
The highest consistency ratings are characterised by two configurations (M4U4D4S3P4I4N3 at 2.90 and 
M4U3D4S3P4I4N3 at 2.81). Of the remaining configurations, a minimum of two and a maximum of 38 
yield the same consistency rating which are then subjected to ‘gestalt’ appreciation and ‘diversity’ 
checks. As the software calculates a straight average of the 21 pairwise consistency ratings, 
occasionally a configuration with otherwise very high internal consistency may contain one 
inconsistent pair. Following previous approaches [7,15], we took into account the first 100 most 
consistent configurations with a consistency rating going down to 2.19. Likewise, there were cases 
where an individual pair was consistent but the configuration viewed as a whole did not appear 
consistent. A total of six configurations (with consistency ratings between 2.29 and 2.19) were ruled 
out throughout this part of the process. 
It is important to include consistent, but diverse, configurations. Of the first 100 configurations only 
14 had flexible generation (S2) as a factor and many were similar. Hence, we expanded the range of 
configurations considered by fixing supply to flexible generation (using functionality of EIDOS). This 
gave a further 53 configurations with a pairwise rating of no less than zero that yield average 
consistency rating varying from 2.0 to 1.76 for flexible generation. 
Two members of the team worked collaboratively to spell out what each consistent combination 
meant. Previous FAR practitioners [7,9,13,15] highlighted the importance of familiarisation with the 
configurations – a form of ‘personal acquaintanceship’ [15, p.274]. Our experience is that by the end 
of this process we were able to recall any combination of MUDSPIN by heart. Transition from 
individual configurations to scenarios is by far the most subjective part of the FAR. The objective is to 
arrive at a progression of combinations stretching out into the future, always applying the gestalt 
appreciation of ‘can I see this world leading to that one?’ [15, p.275]. In our case this involved 
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grouping and re-grouping clusters of configurations bringing them together in the Faustian Tree. 
Each of the clusters is accompanied by a few words describing it as an aid to the process. 
In total, we worked with 147 configurations. Coyle et al. [13] recommend a four-step approach in 
stringing configurations together to create plausible timelines: (i) grouping, (ii) merging, (iii) creation 
of timelines and (iv) scenario generation. They mention the perceived dominance of a factor as a key 
criterion for identifying and merging the groups. In our case, the clustering followed the principle 
that no more than three of the seven MUDSPIN configurations can move by one factor up or down 
[79]. These clusters act as building blocks, describing stages in the progression of each scenario. The 
timelines and sequences of events were then assessed in an expert workshop (N=23) in detailed 
discussions with small groups of 7-8 participants.  
When developing the timelines and sequences of events, we used the insights from the second 
phase of the online surveys on the nature and types of interdependencies – the things which must 
happen in order for the key characteristics to come about [48]. Some practitioners used minimum 
and maximum time diffusion values for each factor which could result in overlooking their cross-
impacts on other factors [13]. The insights generated from the expert survey guided identification of 
the ‘order of things’ in a team exercise (subsequently discussed and assessed in an expert 
workshop). We sought expert opinion on the possible timelines of events that we had already 
developed as the Faustian Tree. Results from the workshop were fed back into the project and the 
Faustian Tree was refined further (Figure 4) and it became apparent which of the timelines would be 
developed into the fully-fledged narrative scenarios. In some cases, the experts disagreed in terms of 
the absolute time at which an event or SG function might occur, but were in stronger agreement 
about the relative point at which these might occur in different scenarios. 
4.3 UK Smart grid scenarios 
We outline each of the four final scenarios; extensive descriptions are available [61]. It is implicit in 
the following scenarios that the degree and geographical extent of smartness will vary. Unless stated 
otherwise, smart development occurs where five essential functions (defined by the experts) are 
achieved: 1) balancing a power grid with high volumes of intermittent renewable resources, 2) 
increasing observability and controllability of the power grid, 3) allowing integration of active loads, 
4) enabling deployment of demand-side reduction technologies and active network management, 
and 5) integration of energy storage. 
We identified some scenario ‘building blocks’ that instigate transition to a number of alternative 
steps depending on changes in factors. An example of such a ‘branching point’ [80] is step G in 
Figure 4 where depending on the emerging supply mix and consumers becoming active or remaining 
passive, end-points F, Q or J might be reached. Whilst consumers remaining passive reinforces the 
existing pathway, active consumers branch to a new pathway thus setting an example of extreme 
uncertainty. While the original FAR method does prevent the identification of branching points, 
these might not naturally arise. The novelty of augmented FAR is that those branching points were 
identified by the experts in Delphi process, increasing the transparency and objectivity of the 
method. The next participatory method, the expert workshop identified the effects and 
consequences of the branching points which are summarised in Table 5. 
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In the Minimum Smart scenario, a lack of coordination and long-term vision coincides with weak 
consumer acceptance of smart technologies and demand-side measures. This scenario, in effect, has 
a lack of strong drivers for any meaningful increase in network smartness. Weaker drivers do exist, 
however, and so there is not a total absence of smartness, although the preponderance of gas 
generation means there is less of a need for demand-side flexibility. 
In contrast, the Groundswell scenario sees very strong consumer interest in and engagement with 
the energy system, resulting in at least partially smart development arising from increased national 
concern over the declining capacity margin and the upward trend in energy prices. This eventually 
causes a radical paradigm shift, with rapid growth in community and local authority-run electricity 
generation and supply and even some local network management. 
The Smart Power Sector scenario is defined by consumers highly resistant to changes in the way 
they use and conceptualise energy. The application of smart technologies can therefore only really 
take place ‘behind the scenes’, and this means there are limits to what can be achieved. Policy and 
regulatory guidance are firm, however, and DNOs are incentivised to do what they need to do when, 
including transition to acting as system operator. Later in the scenario, high numbers of EVs appear 
and there is significant generation from renewables. There remains some possibility of actions on 
the demand side of the meter where this does not rely on significant action from the consumer. 
Smart 2050 sets the upper boundary for our scenarios. Well-coordinated and coherent policy action 
builds strong consumer engagement, resulting in a greater number of smart grid-support services. 
Engagement differs here from the Groundswell scenario in that it is driven by policy. Strong 
coordination and the availability of cost-effective options lead to the emergence of a different set of 
technologies and change the nature of the smart grid correspondingly. 
Table 5. The branching points and their descriptors. 







swell Label Descriptor 
B  RIIO leads to little change     
C RIIO stimulates change     
E* Flexible generation. Constructive 
regulation. Strong incentives. 
    
G NES emerging. Flexible generation. 
Strong policy co-ordination. 
Constructive regulation. Some near-
to-real-time data. 
    
I Policy driven change. Little 
enagagement. Lower cost of capital. 
Move to inflexible generation. 
    
L Existing actors provide NES. Active 
consumers. Economic recovery and 
cheaper capital. Policy weakening. 
    
N* Consumers very active. Existing 
actors dominant. 
    




Figure 4: The Faustian Tree 
Source: Balta-Ozkan et al. [61] 
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5. Discussion 
While there is broad agreement on how smart grids can enable the most cost-effective operation of 
a low carbon grid, there are many uncertainties [62]. Some of the unknowns are: the degree of 
smartness required (or that which can be achieved), when it will be required, how quickly it can and 
will develop, the new actors that may be required, the order in which increasing smartness will occur 
and the level of spatial variation across a network as well as the design of pricing mechanisms and 
emergence of new business paradigms [35]. This evolving uncertainty needs to be considered when 
developing policy and regulation and will need to inform the instruments chosen to incentivise 
different stakeholders, including potential new stakeholders. The multi-stage process described here 
allowed for the perspectives of the widest possible set of stakeholders to inform our scenarios and 
to thus ensure that they reflect a diversity of opinion, accounting for diverse forward planning 
needs. 
The outcomes are defined by complexity, reflecting both the wide range of often interdependent 
factors and the divergence of stakeholder views on the definition, direction and potential added 
value of SGs [81]. Therefore flexibility is a key premise of SG [82] meaning that technical, economic 
and social elements of the system should be designed to be inherently flexible, allowing for current 
unknowns to emerge, such as new energy services and associated companies. 
Public engagement emerged as a key determinant of the likely extent of SG, but this should be of a 
political nature and not purely of economic interest [83]. Scenarios can help to inform this 
engagement process by improving openness and presenting multiple perspectives to the public [28]. 
Stakeholders, including policymakers but also other consumer facing actors, can plan around these 
degrees of engagement to inform their own future needs regarding investment and regulatory 
evolution. By discovering the inherent interdependencies (using expert inputs) in different options 
and branching points across multiple pathways, our findings reveal credible alternative energy 
futures in the form of stories and narratives [84,85] that can be used to engage the different 
stakeholders and assess the implications of alternative decisions. Our Groundswell Scenario offers a 
much more decentralised energy future signified by flourishing community and local energy 
generation, supply and network management. However, a lack of consumer engagement pushes the 
industry to build extensive instrumentation and control behind the meters to manage the grid in 
Smart Power scenario. Each scenario reflects complex interaction of the key factors identified by our 
stakeholders, and the variety of ways these might interact to produce diverse outcomes. They 
represent different directions for the sector, reflecting both potential for action and inaction by 
different stakeholder groups. Our consideration of this complexity, and the scenarios which emerge 
from it, should prove valuable for policymakers, including both government and regulators as well as 
the wider public. Only through such a dialogue, in line with the principles of anticipatory governance 
[86,87] can the opportunities and challenges SGs present can be monitored and managed. More 
specifically, the augmented FAR enabled us to identify and manage the interaction of these multiple 
aspects of SG development in a systematic and transparent way. 
While some scholars have previously incorporated Delphi and semi-structured interviews into 
scenarios [88], our study is their first application to FAR to give a ‘structure’ [15] to the key stage of 
FAR in identifying sectors and factors. The original FAR starts with the imagining of alternative 
futures within the project team to create a common set of future field prospects, we incorporated 
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input from a wider set of experts through the use of a PAG, expert interviews, the two-stage policy 
Delphi and an expert workshop. Collectively, this multiple stage process is an important step 
towards ensuring scenario objectivity [89].  
Pereverza et al. [90] suggest transparency, reliability, coverage, completeness, relevance/density, 
creativity, interpretability, consistency, differentiation and plausibility as key criteria for scenario 
selection. In our case, we found a tension between selecting the most consistent configurations 
(consistency) and those describing a novel narrative (differentiation). Their analysis is limited to a 
five-dimensional and three-dimensional problem space (respectively yielding total combinations of 
72 and 12 to work with), where scenarios are defined as end points. The participatory process we 
followed yielded a seven-dimensional problem space with many scenario configurations embodying 
varying degrees of consistency. As SG development is a process where the interaction of different 
network technologies, data access and management rules, end user behaviours, availability of 
capital etc. influence the availability of future possible options across all dimensions of scenario 
space, the logical ordering of scenario configurations, their timescales and interactions do not 
necessarily follow a linear path. This ‘extreme complexity’ necessitated stringing groups of similar 
scenario configurations together (scenario ‘building blocs’) and critically assessing changes in several 
factors that might change a scenario pathway. 
When ranked by descending consistency many configurations that are similar both in character and 
in overall consistency value end up grouped together. For example, the most consistent 
configurations were those that described either 1) the state of the energy system as it is currently 
(or has been in the recent past) or 2) how it might look after a transition. Regarding the first case, we 
concur with Coyle et al. [13] on the importance of not relaxing the base case. Conceptually, the 
second case is not surprising either because the real value of a SG emanates from its capability for 
enabling the cost-effective management of a grid with large shares of renewable resources and 
controllable loads. In the UK context, the economic value of demand side response, a key capability 
of SG, is projected to be £8.1 billion per year by 2030, along with storage and interconnection [91]. 
Extensive discussions within the project team, working in pairs and with conclusions cross-checked 
by another pair, enabled the development of such a shared understanding. This extensive team-
discussions also prevented us from facing difficulties in deciding on particular relaxations which 
might arise due to ambiguities in sector/factor definitions [13]. 
The corollary to having many configurations characterising either very low carbon, highly smart or 
base cases is that the states in between appear somewhat under-represented. Although this was a 
source of concern initially, we concluded that this is fair: it is self-evident that transition describes 
the dynamic period of upheaval and uncertainty between two more static states, and the lower 
consistencies of the ‘transition period’ configurations reflect this. Such periods of instability/ 
inconsistency are supported by a number of theoretical frameworks which explain energy transitions 
as interactions between niche (micro), regime (meso) and landscape (macro) levels [92] or due to 
coevolution of technologies, institutions, ecosystems, business strategies and user practices [93]. 
The low ratings for the states between the extreme configurations could have resulted from our 
attempts to experiment with the method in order to accommodate a greater number of variables in 
the sector-factor array. Whilst we followed the principles outlined by Duczynski [79] in developing 
the clusters, in practice our implementation was more flexible as some of our factors included 
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movement in two aspects. However, this flexibility is in line with recommendations from Coyle [43, 
p.7] which states that ‘the arrangement in the columns does not mean that a Factor can only change 
to the next adjacent state’. 
Despite equal treatment of any possible future state in a systematic way, we were surprised to find 
many configurations yielding similar average consistency ratings. This might be one of the side 
effects of us employing negative as well as positive values in assessing pairwise consistency of the 
factors. One potential solution to analyse ‘out of the bound’ scenarios could be the use of ‘slot 
machine technique’ by allowing the sectors to take unspecified or free values [11]. However, the 
random nature of such process might void the structured and ‘tractable’ nature of FAR. 
Our observations from the augmentation and implementation of FAR method are as follows: 
 These modifications to the FAR methodology allowed for the system under examination to 
have transitions from one stable state to another, but to pass through periods of 
instability/inconsistency. We suggest that this reflects the practical transitions which occur 
in real-world systems with long turnover times for infrastructure. 
 We observed that for our socio-technical system – and we expect this will be general – it is 
possible that even very ‘non-constrained’ methods of scenario development, such as FAR, 
may be subject to various normative constraints. 
 We observed that for a regulated socio-technical system with both long-lived infrastructure 
and fast-moving technical developments, using a varying degree of inconsistency in a 
pairwise matrix gave greater degrees of freedom in the plausible pathways. We consider 
that this had an impact on how the branching points developed. 
There is no doubt that the development of SGs is a social problem as they offer a means of enabling 
the technologies widely seen as essential to addressing the energy trilemma [94]. Our augmented 
approach has utilised the insights and knowledge of a substantive body of expertise across industry, 
policy and academia. Even though the online surveys were mostly dominated by industry and 
engineering experts, no significant bias by expertise group was detected [48]. Yet, this data 
collection could have been guided by a more explicit consideration of different types of stakeholders 
such as the aggregators, new energy suppliers and technology developers to improve the rigour of 
the study [95]. We recognise that our stakeholder groups can only represent the current landscape. 
6. Conclusions  
For the first time, we have applied FAR to scenarios for a complex socio-technical system. One of the 
defining characteristics of SG (and the power generation and distribution system in general) is that it 
is a safety critical system which operates in a regulated market. The use of branching points is 
particularly well suited to socio-technical systems where policy decisions can alter the pathway or 
scenario outcome. This provides a sense of the order and timing of decisions (dynamics) required to 
move to a particular pathway, or to avoid an undesirable outcome. While the methodology was 
applied to develop scenarios specific to SG growth in the UK, it should be applicable in other 
territories. We would expect to see different scenarios emerge since differences in national 
frameworks include core elements we considered, such as policy and regulatory goals and 
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architectures, existing institutional paradigms, focus on different social and economic outcomes, 
public attitudes, current technology, environmental commitments, renewable energy resource 
potential and others. 
The augmented FAR methodology accommodated sustained input from experts over a prolonged 
period and using methods convenient to them. However, there are limitations to developing 
projections with diverse sets of expert stakeholder groups operating mixes of well-understood and 
novel technologies with disparate sector practices and regulations. In particular we highlight the 
time-consuming nature of generating robust scenario sets. In a large study, experts are only willing 
to give input in well-defined ways in day-long sessions (at most). Therefore, the original FAR method 
of cycling is inappropriate where there is a significant break between steps. It is also in the nature of 
the modern employment market that retaining the exact same group of experts is unlikely. We 
suggest that using feedback and validation cycles at each stage offers advantages over the core 
method for complex studies of national-scale socio-technical systems, especially those of critical 
national need. We recommend using the augmented FAR for issues of extreme complexity, 
particularly multi- or trans-disciplinary socio-technical problems for real-world systems. Such 
systems may be characterised by multiple stakeholders of widely differing scales encompassing 
individuals, multi-national corporations or national and supra-national government entities, 
extensive policy or regulatory requirements, and decisions with multi-decadal or intergenerational 
effects. The problems may be characterised as having demands on some dimensions which can 
change at rates far faster than the long-term effects, perhaps some having the possibility of major 
changes occurring faster than a year. In addition, suitable systems may exhibit constraints such as 
the predetermined logical ordering of some events and varying minimum temporal periods between 
them. 
It is largely inevitable that electricity supply industries in the developed world will become smarter 
as a result of the changing requirements that society is placing on electricity systems as part of the 
decarbonisation process. The evolving nature of its regulatory framework reflects the uncertainties 
associated with the development of SG in the UK. This has been at least partially acknowledged with 
the adoption of the RIIO framework (Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs) as the central 
mechanism for transmission and distribution network regulation in the UK, with its intention of 
incentivising network operators to innovate their planning and risk management for the new 
circumstances as they develop [39,96]. While initially RIIO was designed to cover an eight-year 
investment period, the fast pace of technological development and inherent uncertainties 
associated with the changes in energy markets saw a reduction in the price review period to five 
years [97]. There is of course no guarantee at this stage that RIIO will be effective in meeting longer 
term goals. We note that that experts considered there was potential for both the Smart Power and 
Minimum Smart scenarios even if RIIO failed. 
As scenarios extend further from the present the difficulty of extrapolation increases as the 
uncertainties cascade. As with all scenario generation methods, the outputs of the augmented FAR 
are not intended to be accurate predictions of the future. Their usefulness derives from the process: 
identifying the widest possible set of issues, potential barriers, and in particular the 
interdependencies between different technological realms, the requirement for policy and 
regulation to account for these, and varying approaches and practices of the sector experts. Bringing 
these together allow for policymakers and other stakeholders to be better informed of opportunities 
26 
and points for action to enable change while reducing scope for unexpected consequences. We 
expect that our scenarios can better inform anticipatory governance and subsequent planning which 
can be made more appropriate to the different routes that SG development might follow.  
The development of scenarios which can increase understanding of the ways in which policy 
concerning different elements of increasing systemic smartness might interact allows insights into 
possible problems ahead of their emergence and for more informed policy and regulatory planning. 
The need for consideration and coordination of different elements of planning, policy and regulation 
are essential and augmented FAR enables unpacking these multiple interdependencies. 
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